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Abstract
In mainstream economics individuals are supposed driven only by their
self interest. By contrast, in this article, in the line of a "new synthesis" in
moral psychology we assert that the voting behavior over redistribution is
best characterized by first an automatic cognitive process which generates
quicly intuitions on the fair level of redistribution, and second by a rational
self oriented reasoning which controls the feeling of guilt associated with the
fair intuitions. As a result of this dual-process decision-making, we show that
the U-shape between inequality and redistribution supported by the data is
a general feature of the model. In addition, assuming that the feeling of
guilt is context dependent and is reduced if the previous generation failed in
implementing the intuitively fair institution, the model exhibits a multiplic-
ity of steady states which can explain the huge diﬀerence of redistribution
observed between Europe and the United States.
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1 Introduction
In mainstream economics individuals are supposed driven only by their self
interest. As a consequence, when studying the redistributive phenomenon in
democracy, the first challenge for most economists is to explain why there
is so little redistribution in democracy. Indeed, considering that the idea of
democracy is captured by the majority rule, as the median citizen is char-
acterized by an income lower than the average, a majority should support a
complete redistribution of income to satisfy his self interest. As a canonical
answer to this issue, Meltzer and Richard (1981) have showed that selfish
people have no interest to support a too high redistribution, even if they are
poorer than average, because of a tax disincentive eﬀect that lowers produc-
tivity. Their model also implies that we should observe a growing relationship
between redistribution and income inequality. However, such relationship is
weakly supported by data. While redistribution is higher in Europe than in
the United States, their pre-tax income inequalities appear similar (see Table
1). By contrast, Perotti (1996), Moene and Wallerstein (2001) and Iversen
and Soskice (2006) support that the empirical relationship between inequal-
ity and redistribution is the opposite of the predicted one; or it exhibits a
U-shape as suggested by de Mello and Tiongson (2006).
3
Countries Pretax-tax income
inequality (GINI)
Public Social Spend-
ings (% GDP)
France 0.48 29.2
Germany 0.51 26.7
Sweden 0.43 29.4
UK 0.46 21.3
US 0.46 15.9
Table 1. Income inequality and social spending in 2005 (source: OECD).
In order to improve the canonical model’s predictions, four main direc-
tions, economic, political, institutional and behavioral, have been investi-
gated1. From an economic perspective, considering imperfections in the
credit and in the insurance markets, Bénabou (2000) has stressed an enhanc-
ing productivity eﬀect of redistribution which can balance the tax discentive
eﬀect and lead to a multiplicity of equilibria. From a political perspective, it
has been argued that rich people have more influence in the political process
because of their higher propension to vote, their campaign contributions or
their lobbying activities, and then that the pivotal voter is not characterized
by the median income (see Rodriguez, 2004, Campante, 2006, Petrova, 2008).
In addition, Roemer (1998) supports that political choices are in essence mul-
1See Alesina and Angeletos (2004), Lind (2005) and Campante (2006) for an overview.
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tidimentionals and therefore that stable coalitions cannot be characterized
only by the income of their members. From an institutional perspective,
Iversen and Soskice (2006) have argued that the two-party majoritarian sys-
tem which characterizes the United States lowers the pressures for redis-
tribution compared to a multiparty proportional system as in Europe. At
least, from a behavioral perspective, Bénabou and Ok (2001) and Bénabou
and Tirole (2006) have pointed out that poor people do not support high
redistribution because they expect becoming rich, eventually by manipulat-
ing their perception of the social mobility. The postulate that individuals
are driven only by their self interest has also been challenged when studying
redistribution (Piketty, 1995, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005, Lind, 2007).
It has been challenged first because an impressive number of experimental
studies have pointed out that individuals do not behave selfishly in the way
supposed in mainstream economics (see Batson, 1991, Fehr and Schmidt,
2006). Evidence appears particularly clear in the Ultimatum Game (Güth et
al, 1982). In this game, two anonimous subjects must agree in the split of a
given amount of money ($10). One participant, the proposer, can make one
proposal on how to split the money. The other one, the recipient, can either
accept or reject the proposal. If he accepts, the proposal is carried out, if not
both players get nothing. In theory, in such a one-shot game the proposer
should oﬀer to the recipient an amount of money as low as possible, and
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the recipient should accept any proposal superior to 0. By contrast, robust
findings in the lab show an average proposal of $4 with lots of proposed
50/50 splits. Besides, any proposal below $2.50 has a high probability to
be rejected and about 25% of proposals are rejected. The Ultimatum Game
stresses behaviors which are characterized by fairness and inequity aversion.
The fact that people can act fairly as underlined in experimental studies
does not entail that the standard assumption of human selfishness is not
relevant in most domain of economics. As noted for example by Adam Smith
(in The Wealth of Nations, 1776), ”It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest.” But studies from Fong (2001), Corneo and
Grüner, (2002), Alesina and La Ferrara, (2005), Corneo and Fong, (2008) and
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) clearly show that people do care about fairness
in their demand for redistibution. In addition, for Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote (2001) the fact that beliefs according to which luck rather than
eﬀort determines income2 are strong predictors of the level of redistribution
(as suggested in Figure 1) is another evidence supporting that fairness, unlike
income inequality, has a major influence in shaping redistributive politics.
In the utilitarian trend, the notion of fairness in economics appears log-
2From World Values Survey data, they highlight that 54% of Europeans versus 30% of
Americans believe that luck rather than eﬀort determines income.
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Figure 1: Social spending and luck (source: Alesina, Glaeser, Sacerdote, 2001).
ically associated with a function which aggregates individual utilities, the
social welfare. In this line, if voters care only about the welfare of the whole
population when considering redistribution, Piketty (1995) has showed that
international diﬀerences in the level of redistribution when countries share
identical economic fundamentals can be explained by diﬀerent beliefs about
social mobility sustained by an imperfect learning process. Closer from a
concept of reciprocal altruism, Lind (2007) considers the case where voters
care about their self interest and the welfare of the members of their own
group more than the rest of the population. In such a context, he shows that
both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce redistribution. In the
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line of Gilens (1999), he supports then that the diﬀerence of redistribution
between Europe and the United States can be explained by a diﬀerence of
ethnic fractionalization. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005), voters also care
about both their self interest and fairness. In their model, fairness is not de-
fined according to an utilitarian social welfare as in Piketty (1995) and Lind
(2007), but according to the deontological principle that everyone should re-
ceive what he deserves whose relevance is empirically supported in psychology
and sociology (see Schokkaert, 1998, Forsé and Parodi, 2006). With income
depending on eﬀort and luck, they show that cultural variability arises as
a multiplicity of equilibria resulting from diﬀerent self-fulfilled beliefs. By
expecting low redistribution, Americans invest in their human capital and
generate conditions for low redistribution by reducing the importance of luck
in the income determination. Conversely, by expecting a high redistribution,
Europeans invest less in their human capital and will support later a high
redistribution.
In this article, we consider that voters are influenced both by fairness (in
the way of Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) and their self interest conserning
redistribution. In addition, in the line of recent findings in neurosciences and
cognitive psychology, we also explicitly consider that fair and selfish motives
are generated by two distinct cognitive processes whose diﬀerent features
(see Appendix A) are of interest in explaining cultural variability of redis-
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tributive politics. First, as argued by Haidt (2001, 2007, 2008; see also Nado
et al., 2006), an automatic and domain-specific cognitive process34 quickly
generates and relates moral intuitions (shaped according to Hauser, 2006,
and Mikhail, 2007, by a Universal Moral Grammar or UMG) then emotions
such as guilt. Supporting this thesis, a large number of both neuroimaging
and neuropsychological studies (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, Berthoz et al.,
2002, 2006, Moll et al., 2002, 2005, Decety and Chaminade, 2003, Hsu et
al., 2008; Damasio, 1994, Anderson et al., 1999, Blair, 2001, Koenigs and
Tranel, 2007; see Greene, 2005, Young and Koenigs, 2007 for reviews) show
that fair behaviors are associated with brain areas involved in emotional
processing (amygdala, insula, ...). For example, considering the Ultimatum
Game, Sanfey et al. (2003) have showed that the rejection of an unfair pro-
posal (assimilated to a fair punishment) was related to the activation of the
anterior insula. Besides, the rejection of an unfair proposal has also been
associated with an increased skin conductance which reveals the emotional
intensity of the choice (van ’t Wout et al., 2006). Emotions are then inte-
grated into a self oriented rational cognitive process (system 2; see Appendix
3As explained by Fehr and Schmidt (2006), "the term automatic in this case refers to a
process that does not require conscious and eﬀortfull processing but which can nevertheless
be inhibited or controlled."
4Such a cognitive process is named system 1 by Kanhneman, 2003; see also Camerer
et al. 2005, Evans, 2008, and Appendix
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A) such that the human behavior is equally driven by emotions and by the
rational reasoning standard in economics (Gray, 2004, Bechara, 2004, Cohen,
2005, Pessoa, 2008).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose
a model in the line of the dual-process theory of decision-making. An in-
tuitively fair level of redistribution is generated by an automatic cognitive
process (UMG), and the related feeling of guilt is controlled by a rational self
oriented reasoning as described in Figure 1. We then show that the U-shape
between inequality and redistribution which is supported by the data is a
general feature of the model. In section 3, assuming that the feeling of guilt
is context dependent and is reduced if the previous adult generation failed
in implementing the intuitively fair level of redistribution, we show that the
model exhibits a multiplicity of steady states which can explain the huge dif-
ference of redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. In
section 4, we generalize the multiplicity of steady states result when taking
into account family history and the intergenerational transmission of inequal-
ity. We conclude briefly in a last section.
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Figure 2: Dual-process decision-making and voting over redistribution
2 Redistribution: frommoral intuition to the
rational control of guilt
The economy is populated by a continuum of mass one of individuals whose
actions take place according to the timeline on Figure 2. For each individual
of type i, the second period pre-tax income is
yi = ai + ei + εi (1)
where ei is the level of eﬀort he makes in period 1, ai is a positive parame-
ter which represents his intrinsic motivations5 (known in period 1), and εi
5Intrinsic motivations are motivations which are unrelated (or eventually negatively
related) to external rewards such as income or status (see Ryan and Deci, 2000, Bénabou
and Tirole, 2002).
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Figure 3: Timing of actions
represents his luck (or bad luck) in period 2, unknown in period 1 such that
E1 [εi] = 0 and independent from his intrinsic skills.
Redistribution is characterized by a taxation rate τ and a lump sum
allocation g. If we suppose a balanced budget, then g = τw¯.
2.1 Eﬀort
Let us assume that the rational reasoning is characterized by the maximiza-
tion of the consumption in period 2 while eﬀort involves a utility loss equal to
e2i
2αi
in period 1, where αi represents a taste for eﬀort. The rational reasoning
(system 2) of an individual i can therefore be characterized by the following
function:
Ui = yi (1− τ) + τ y¯ −
e2i
2βiαi
(2)
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where βi < 1 represents procrastination or willpower (see Bénabou and Ti-
role, 2006). If the choice of eﬀort entails no moral conflict, the optimal
eﬀort for each individual corresponds to the maximization of E1 [Ui] and is
characterized by:
ei = βiαi (1− τ) (3)
As usual, we can observe that redistribution reduces the eﬀort incentive.
Assume then that cognitive skills behind intrinsic motivations are perfectly
correlated with taste for eﬀort and willpower such that ai = βiαi. With (3),
the pre-tax income (1) can be rewritten as:
yi = ai (2− τ) + εi (4)
As the level of eﬀort is reduced by redistribution, of course the pre-tax is
reduced. As a consequence, redistribution will reduce not only the variance
of the disposable income, but also the variance of the pre-tax income.
2.2 Moral intuition
In the line of the dual-process theory of decision making (Kaneman, 2003)
and the "new synthesis" in moral psychology (Haidt, 2001, 2007, 2008; see
also Nado et al., 2006), let us assume a cognitive process which automati-
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cally and quickly generates moral intuitions. Assume in addition that these
intuitions when considering income distribution are characterized by the de-
ontological principle that each people should receive what he deserves6, where
the deserved or fair income is defined by:
yˆi = ai + ei (5)
i.e. the income without luck and bad luck7. Following Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), we then characterize the universal sense of fairness by:
F =
Z
i
{[(1− τ) yi + τ y¯]− yˆi}2 di (6)
The fair-motivated cognitive process characterized by (6) urges people to
reduce unfairness. As α and ε are independently distributed, (4) allows to
rewrite (6) as (see Appendix B):
6Forsé et Parodi (2006) show that European countries share an identical hierarchy of
moral principles: first the guarantee of basic needs, second fairness (merit), and far less
important equality of income. If we admit that basic needs are mostly satisfied in Europe
and in the United States, fairness is the relevant concept to study marginal variations of
the redistribution levels.
7The existence of a universal fair income distribution supposes that it must be shared
by each individual independently of his own income. On French data, Piketty (2003) shows
that such an assumption is supported.
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F
σ2a
= (1− τ)2 L+ τ 2 (2− τ)2 (7)
where L = σ
2
ε
σ2a
, σ2ε being the variance of ε which represents the importance of
luck in the income determination (one can think of a simple case where ε = ±l
with probability 1
2
, and then where σ2ε =
1
2
l2) and σ2a being the variance of a.
L represents then the relative importance of luck in the income determination
and the intuitive fair tax rate which corresponds to the minimization of (7)
is as follows:
τ f =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1−
q
1− L
2
1
if L ≤ 2
otherwise
(8)
Under this fair motive, the tax rate is only increasing with the relative
importance of luck in the income determination: ∂τ
f
∂L > 0. As the relative
importance of luck is defined by L = σ
2
ε
σ2α
, it also means that an increase of the
variance of a reduces the relative luck and then ∂τ
f
∂σ2α
< 0. In addition, let us
admit that an increase of the variance is correlated with an increase between
mean and median incomes. For example, assume that a is equal to a0 = 1
with probability ρ > 1
2
and a1 > 1 with probability 1 − ρ. In such a case,
setting a¯−amed = ∆, we can show with simplicity that σ2a = ρ1−ρ∆2 and then
that ∂σ
2
a
∂∆ > 0 (similar results could be obtained using standard statistical
distributions such as Pareto and Lognormal). It follows that an increase of
the diﬀerence between mean and median incomes is associated with a lower
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intuitive fair level of redistribution.
2.3 Guilt, rational control and the demand for redis-
tribution
For any level of redistribution that an individual could choose, compared to
his intuition of what is fair, he will have a feeling of guilt. We can reasonably
assume that this feeling of guilt will be all the stronger as the potential
redistributive choice τ will be far from the fair level τ f . Let us then define
the self-conscious experience of guilt as follows:
ϕ
2
¡
τ f − τ
¢2
(9)
If an individual is only driven by his emotion of guilt, he will always choose
the fair level of redistribution. But, as explained by Gray (2004), "At some
point of processing, functional specialization is lost, and emotion and cogni-
tion conjointly and equally contribute to the control of thought and behavior",
i.e. emotion is integrated into the rational reasoning or is controlled by this
rational process. The voting behavior in period 1 is therefore characterized
by maximizing:
E1
∙
yi (1− τ) + τ y¯ −
e2i
2βi
¸
− ϕ
2
¡
τ f − τ
¢2
(10)
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Considering (4), it follows that the optimal level of redistribution for an
individual of type i is:
τ i =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
2(a¯−ai)+ϕτf
2a¯−ai+ϕ
0
if ai ≤ a¯+ ϕτ
f
2
otherwise
(11)
Knowing that τ i (defined by 11) is a decreasing function of ai and assum-
ing that the distribution of a is skewed to the right, i.e.amed ≤ a¯, it entails
that the tax rate chosen under the majority rule is characterized by:
τ ∗ =
2 (a¯− amed) + ϕτ f
2a¯− amed + ϕ
(12)
Let τ s = 2(a¯−amed)
2a¯−amed be the taxation rate if people were driven only by their
self interest, i.e. if ϕ = 0, we can rewrite (12) as:
τ ∗ = ξτ s + (1− ξ) τ f (13)
where ξ = 2a¯−amed
2a¯−amed+ϕ . As amed ≤ a¯, 0 < ξ ≤ 1 and the level of taxation τ
∗ is
then a convex combination of the selfish level τ s and the fair one τ f , where
the weighting depends only of the distribution of a. It follows that:
Proposition 1 Any increase of the importance of luck in the income deter-
mination, everything else being equal, results in the increase of the level of
redistribution.
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As the variance of ε only aﬀects the relative importance of luck in the
wage determination L, proposition 1 is straightforward: any increase of σ2ε
increases L, then τ f and τ ∗.
Proposition 2 Assume that ∂σ
2
a
∂∆ > 0, ∀0 < σ2a ≤
σ2ε
2
(L ≤ 2) and ∀0 < ϕ <
∞, the level of redistribution exhibits a U-shape with the diﬀerence between
mean and median incomes (see Appendix C).
The impact of an increase of the diﬀerence between mean and median
incomes appears complex. First, as usual in the standard model, such an
increase leads to an increase of the selfish tax rate. For example, assume
again that a is equal to a0 = 1 with probability ρ > 12 and a1 > 1 with
probability 1 − ρ. With a¯ − amed = ∆, it follows that τ s = 2∆1+2∆ and then
that ∂τ
s
∂∆ > 0. But at the same time σ
2
a =
ρ
1−ρ∆
2 and then ∂σ
2
a
∂∆ > 0. An
increase of the diﬀerence between mean and median incomes is then also
related to an increase of σ2a which reduces the relative importance of luck
in the income determination and therefore τ f (eq. 8). The total eﬀect on
τ ∗ is then uncertain and depends of the weighting ξ. We can thereafter
observe that ξ is an incresing function of the diﬀerence between the mean
and the median incomes. In other words, the importance of τ s (respectively
τ f) in the determination of τ ∗ is all the more (all the less) important that the
diﬀerence between mean and median incomes is strong. It follows that the
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leading eﬀect when∆ is small is supported by τ f and in this case any increase
of ∆ (which is associated with an increase of σ2a and then a decrease of L)
would result in a decrease of τ ∗ whereas the leading eﬀect when ∆ is strong
is supported by τ s and any increase of σ2a in this case would result in an
increase of τ ∗. The U-shape between inequality and redistribution which is
supported by the data is then a general feature of the model. Nevertheless,
at this point, we can not assert that this result is specifically due to the
distinction between system 1 and system 2. Indeed, in a more standard
approach where fairness would be part of a global reasoning, i.e. part of a
stable utility function as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005), a small level of
redistribution considering the fair concern would generate a large desutility
which is similar to our concept of guilt. Therefore, as long as we consider that
the diﬀerence of the level of redistribution observed between Europe and the
United States is only sustained by diﬀerent exogenous parameters (σ2a and
σ2ε), we can deduce that the existence of a universal sense of fairness helps
understanding the U-shape between inequality and redistribution whatever
the distinction between system 1 and system 2.
Consider alternatively that the cultural variability could persist even with
identical economic fundamentals. In that case, emphasizing on the context-
dependency of the feeling of guilt (Markus and Kitayama, 1991, Scherer,
1997, Tracy and Robins, 2004) appears particularly relevant. Indeed, if we
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follow the cultural trend in psychology, the feeling of guilt can both create and
be shaped by cultural practices and institutions, and the cultural variability
of the redistributive intitutions may arise from multiple steady states.
3 Feeling guilty and context dependency
In the cognitive trend of psychology, in the line of evolutionary theory, emo-
tion is often viewed as a universal set of largely prewired internal processes of
self-maintenance and self-regulation (LeDoux, 1996, Ekman, 1992). Under
this biological aspect of emotion, nonverbal measures such as facial expres-
sions, skin conductance or the activation of certain parts of the brain (amyg-
dala, insula, ...) have been favored to assess the universality of the emotional
phenomena (see Phelps, 2009). Using facial expressions, Ekman and Friesen
(1971) have for example suggested that there exist six basic emotional ex-
pressions (happy, sad, fear, anger, disgust and surprise) whose characteristics
are universally observed across culture. But, in the cultural trend of psychol-
ogy closer to anthropology, along with these six basic emotions exists self-
conscious emotions such as guilt or pride which are complex social emotions
whose experience is not characterized by universality (Markus and Kitayama,
1991, Mesquita and Frijda, 1992, Frijda and Mesquita, 1994, Scherer, 1997,
Eisenberg, 2000, Tracy and Robins, 2004, Goetz and Keltner, 2007, Edel-
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stein and Shaver, 2007). To illustrate their point, Tracy and Robins (2004)
explain that a person may feel great happiness after winning either a lottery
or an athletic event, but that only the athletic success can generate pride.
Following this reasoning, we argue that if an athletic success can generate
pride, it can also generate guilt if there is cheating or drug use, but obviously
the self-conscious exprience of guilt will be the less important that the drug
use is generalized and established as a norm. In other words, a self-conscious
emotion is context-dependent because it is based on a self evaluation process
which requires comparison with others’ behaviors and cultural practices. As
an evidence, Harlé and Sanfey (2007) and Twenge et al. (2007) have showed
that manipulating the environment in prosocial behavior experiments (Ulti-
matum Game in Harlé and Sanfey, 2007) can change significantly the results.
In addition, prosocial behavior experiments (among which UG) undertaken
in small-scale societies suggest that "culturally transmitted behavioral vari-
ation may substantially aﬀect decision-making" (Henrich, 2000, Henrich et
al., 2001, 2005).
To take into account the cultural side of human behaviors, consider now
an OLG model where individuals live for two periods, childhood and adult-
hood. During the first period, child are socialized. When adult, individuals
vote, work and consume according to the same timeline already described
in Fig. 1 (see Fig. ). In addition, let us assume now that, even if we still
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Figure 4: Timing of actions when considering socialization
consider that the moral intuition is universal, the self-conscious expression
of guilt is shaped by culturally transmitted (during childhood) practices and
institutions. More precisely, let us assume that unfairness of the institution
observed by a person during his childhood, chosen by the previous adult gen-
eration, reduces his conscious feeling of guilt when adult, we can represent
the self-conscious experience of guilt by:
Φ
2Γt−1
¡
τ f − τ
¢2
(14)
where Γt−1 =
h
τ ft−1 − τ ∗t−1
i2
represents the unfairness of the institution cho-
sen by the previous adult generation in t− 1.
22
In such a case, by adapting directly (13), we deduce that the level of
redistribution in t is characterized by:
τ ∗t = ξtτ
s + (1− ξt) τ f (15)
where
ξt =
2a¯− amed
2a¯− amed + Φ
[τft−1−τ∗t−1]
2
(16)
It follows that:
Proposition 3 If τ f − τ s > 2
q
Φ
2a¯−amed , the model exhibits two steady states
characterized by:
τ ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
τ f
1
2
³
τ f + τ s −
q
(τ f − τ s)2 − 4Φ
2a¯−amed
´
where τ f =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1−
q
1− L
2
1
if L ≤ 2
otherwise
and τ s = 2(a¯−amed)
2a¯−amed .
The multiplicity of steady states results from the interaction of the two
distinct processes. First, guilt that people can feel in relation with their
moral duty shapes the voting behavior: the stronger is this feeling, the closer
from fair intuition is their choice. Second, if people are socialized in a cul-
tural environment whose cultural practices and institutions do not reflect
the intuitive fairness, internalization of the observed norm it is allowed to
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act unfairly, or you should behave according to your own interest, will reduce
individual responsability and therefore the feeling of guilt considering the
moral duty. By contrast, if people are socialized in a cultural environment
whose cultural practices and institutions reflect the intuitive fairness, the
norm it is not allowed to act unfairly observed reinforce the feeling of guilt.
We therefore observe, if τ f − τ s > 2
q
Φ
2a¯−amed , that the convergence towards
the two diﬀerent steady states depends only from the initial level of taxation
as stated in proposition 2.
Proposition 4 Consider the tax sequence {τ t}t=∞t=0 and suppose that τ f −
τ s > 2
q
Φ
2a¯−amed , if τ 0 ∈
¤
τ f − δ; τ f + δ
£
, where δ =
τf−τs−
?
(τf−τs)
2− 4Φ
2a¯−amed
2
,
then lim
t→∞
τ t = τ f , while if τ 0 /∈
¤
τ f − δ; τ f + δ
£
lim
t→∞
τ t = 12
³
τ f + τ s −
q
(τ f − τ s)2 − 4Φ
2a¯−amed
´
.
If the initial level of taxation corresponds to an institution suﬃciently
closed to the fair level, the feeling of guilt will be reinforced and people next
period will vote for an even closer from fair level of redistribution. This
emotional contagion process ends with the implementation of the fair insti-
tution, τ ∗ = τ f . By contrast, starting from a point where the institution
is suﬃciently far from the fair level leads to a too strong signal you should
behave according to your own interest which reduces concerns about morality
and then the associated feeling of guilt, preventing from an emotional con-
tagion to the benefit of a rational selfish control. The process will end at a
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Figure 5: Multiple steady states when τ f − τ s > 2
q
Φ
2a¯−amed
redistribution level lower than the fair level but higher than the selfish one,
τ s < τ ∗ < τ f .
According to our analysis, the high redistribution European style welfare
state is then characterized by an emotional contagion whereas the low redis-
tribution American style welfare system is characterized by a rational control:
τ s < τUS < τEU = τ f . As a consequence, in the European style system, as
τEU = τ f , any increase of the diﬀerence between mean and median incomes
∆ can be associated with a decrease of the relative importance of luck in
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the wage determination L which tends to reduce the level of redistribution:
dτEU
d∆ < 0. By contrast, we can show in the American style system that an
increase of ∆ is still associated with less redistribution, dτ
US
d∆ > 0, as in the
Meltzer-Richard model (1981). This cultural analysis suggests then that we
should dissociate Europe and the United States when testing the empirical
relationship between redistribution and income inequality.
4 Family transfers and inequality
So far, in the income determination we have apprehended luck only as a white
noise. By making this, we have obviously omitted one important dimension
of luck which is being born in a wealthy and well-educated family, and there-
fore the importance of the bequests and any other inheritted social capital
(status, network, ...) in the income determination. Let us now consider that
individual life income can be characterized by:
yit = πit−1 + ait + eit + εit (17)
where πit−1 represents the parental transfers, bequests and social capital. If
parental transfers are the expression of a warm glow eﬀect or a joy of giving,
i.e a selfish incentive, the transfers πit that an adult will receive in t + 1
enter in the utility of his parents in t, and we can redefine the rational-selfish
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utility as8:
Uit =
1
ψψ (1− ψ)1−ψ
c1−ψit π
ψ
it −
e2it
2ait
(18)
It follows that maximizing (18) according to consumption and family
transfers entails:
cit = (1− ψ) [(1− τ t) yit + τ ty¯t] (19)
πit = ψ [(1− τ t) yit + τ ty¯t] (20)
and that introducing these optimal behaviors (19) and (20) into (18) leads
to an unchanged rational utility compared to previous sections:
Uit = yit (1− τ t) + τ ty¯t −
e2it
2ait
(21)
In this configuration, the level of eﬀort which corresponds to the maxi-
mization of (21) is then still:
eit = ait (1− τ t) (22)
8Even if we had consider a true altruistic motive, loving his children can be associated
with nepotism which is a dynastic selfishness, and not with fairness or morality as stated
by Sober and Wilson (1998).
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Consider now that we can integrate in the concept of fair income the
principle of equal opportunities. In this case we can redefine the fair level of
income as:
yˆit = π¯t−1 + ait + eit
This characterization of the fair level of income strongly diﬀers from the
one of Alesina and Angeletos (2005). The latter consider fairness under a
dynastic basis, which means that they assume that a transfer received by a
person is fair if related to an eﬀort from his parents. Nevertheless, studies
tend to support fairness on a more individual basis, i.e. that individuals tend
to associate family transfers with unfairness. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
show in particular that people who believe that family background influence
income and then that opportunities in life are biaised favor redistribution in
order to correct for unfair advantages.
If we assume that parental transfers πit−1 received by an adult in t are
independent from his willpower and personal skills ait and from his luck εit,
and that distributions of a and ε are stable over time, the moral intuition
which results from the minimization of (6) stays:
τ ft =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1−
q
1− Lt
2
1
if Lt−1 ≤ 2
otherwise
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where Lt =
σ2πt−1+σ
2
ε
σ2a
, σ2πt−1 being the variance of the family transfers re-
ceived in t. Determination of his preferred tax rate by each individual corre-
sponds then to the maximization in 1 of the utility minus the feeling of guilt,
E1
h
yit (1− τ t) + τ y¯t − e
2
it
2βi
i
− Φ
2[τft−1−τ∗t−1]
2
³
τ ft − τ t
´2
, which results in:
τ ∗t = ξt−1τ
s
t +
¡
1− ξt−1
¢
τ ft (23)
where τ st =
2(a¯−amed)+(π¯t−1−πmedt−1)
2a¯−amed is the tax rate chosen by a median voter
driven only by his self-interest, and ξt−1 =
2a¯−amed
2a¯−amed+ Φ
[τft−1−τ∗t−1]
2
.
Let us assume an institutional stationary history such that τ s = τ−1, ∀s ≤
t− 1, in such a case we have (see Appendix E):
τ st =
h
2 + ψ(1−τ−1)(2−τ−1)
1−ψ(1−τ−1)
i
(a¯− amed)
2a¯− amed
σ2π (τ−1) =
ψ2 (1− τ−1)2
1− ψ2 (1− τ−1)2
£
(2− τ−1)2 σ2a + σ2ε
¤
Proposition 5 Under a stationnary tax history {τ s = τ−1}s=t−1s=−∞, any sta-
tionary level of taxation only driven by moral intuitions τ t = τ f or by self-
interest τ t = τ s is unique.
Proposition 6 Under a stationnary tax history {τ s = τ−1}s=t−1s=−∞, if τ f − τ s
is suﬃciently high, the model exhibits two steady states such that τ s < τUS <
τEU = τ f .
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Figure 6: Multiple steady states and family history
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From proposition 5 et 6, again we can assert that the possibility of a mul-
tiple steady states results from the interaction of the two distinct processes.
We can not detail explicitly the conditions of existence as in the previous
section, but by similarity it is easy to deduce that a multiplicity can arise
only if τ f and τ s are suﬃciently diﬀerents. A limit case where it is proven is
of course when ψ is close to 0. Indeed, in such a case we are without family
transfers, i.e. in the case treated in the previous section. Considering family
transfers allow still us to interpret the diﬀerence of redistribution between
Europe and the United States as a distinction in the nature of the lead-
ing cognitive process when voting: emotional (system 1) in Europe, rational
(system 2) in the United States.
5 Conclusion
If we consider that humans are only driven by their self interest, Meltzer and
Richard (1981) show that the level of redistribution in a democratic society
is growing with the inequality of the income distribution. A result which is
weakly supported by the data. In this article, we assert that this failure of
the canonical model can be in particular associated with its behavioral as-
sumption. Modern cognitive sciences along with empirical studies converge
in one major point: morality and altruism are essentials to explain redistri-
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bution. In the line of a "new synthesis" in moral psychology, we then assert
that the voting behavior over redistribution is best characterized by first an
automatic cognitive process which generates quicly intuitions on the fair level
of redistribution, and second by a rational self oriented reasoning which con-
trols the feeling of guilt associated with the fair intuitions. As a result of this
dual-process decision-making, we show that the U-shape between inequality
and redistribution supported by the data is a general feature of the model.
In addition, assuming that the feeling of guilt is context dependent and is
reduced if the previous generation failed in implementing the intuitively fair
institution, the model exhibits a multiplicity of steady states which can ex-
plain the huge diﬀerence of redistribution observed between Europe and the
United States.
The approach we use in this article raises two issues which can lead to
further research. First, the mind architecture that we use in this article,
in the line of Kahneman (2003) and Haidt (2001), states a clear partition
between an emotional process and a rational one. For most neurobiologists,
such a partition is a highly stylised distinction with no strong basis. By
contrast, in the neural workspace model proposed by Dehaene et al. (1998)
and Dehaene and Naccache (2001), lots of distinct groups of neurons convey
in parrallel diﬀerent representation of the external world, and the resulting
conscious perception of the external world often adopts the information of one
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neural group and entirely suppresses the information carried by the others
according to the winner-take-all principle (Camerer et al., 2005). Second,
our approach suggests that emotions are by essence morals. However, as
well as guilt we can think of greed as an important emotion shaping human
behavior, especially when considering voting over redistribution.
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Appendix A. Clusters of attributes associ-
ated with dual-process decision-making (from
Evans, 2008)
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AppendixB. The fair-oriented cognitive process
The moral objective is characterized by
F =
Z
i
{[(1− τ) yi + τ y¯]− yˆi}2 di
According to eq. (4),
F =
Z
i
{[(1− τ) (ai (2− τ) + εi) + τ a¯ (2− τ)]− ai (2− τ)}2 di
=
Z
i
{(1− τ) εi − τ (2− τ) (ai − a¯)}2 di.
As α and ε are independently distributed over the population,
F = (1− τ)2
Z
i
ε2idi+τ 2 (2− τ)
2
Z
i
(ai − a¯)2 di = (1− τ)2 σ2ε+τ 2 (2− τ)
2 σ2a.
It follows that
F
σ2a
= (1− τ)2 L+ τ 2 (2− τ)2
where L = σ
2
η
σ2α
.
Appendix C. Proof of proposition 2
∂τ∗
∂(α¯−αmed) =
∂τ∗
∂σ2α
h
∂(α¯−αmed)
∂σ2α
i−1
⇒ sign
h
∂τ∗
∂(α¯−αmed)
i
= sign
h
∂τ∗
∂σ2α
i
Diﬀerentiating eq. (13) gives:
∂τ∗
∂σ2α
= ∂ξ∂σ2α
τ s + ξ ∂τ
s
∂σ2α
− ∂ξ∂σ2α
∙
1−
³
1− 1
2
σ2η
σ2α
´ 1
2
¸
+ [1− ξ]
⎡
⎣ −σ2η
4
?
1− 1
2
σ2η
σ2α
? 1
2
σ4α
⎤
⎦,
where ∂ξ∂σ2α =
?
2 ∂α¯
∂σ2α
−∂αmed
∂σ2α
?
ϕ
(2α¯−αmed+ϕ)2
> 0.
It follows that:
lim
σ2α→∞
∂τ∗
∂σ2α
= ∂ξ∂σ2α
τ s + ξ ∂τ
s
∂σ2α
> 0
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and lim
σ2α→
σ2η
2
∂τ∗
∂σ2α
= −∞.
Appendix D. Proof of proposition 3
Let us define δt = τ f −τ ∗t the diﬀerence between the fair and the eﬀective
level of taxation, eq (15) can be rewritten as:
δt =
2a¯− amed
2a¯− amed + Φδ2t−1
¡
τ f − τ s
¢
(24)
and the stationnarity is then defined by:
δ3 −
¡
τ f − τ s
¢
δ2 +
Φ
2a¯− amed
δ = 0 (25)
If
¯¯
τ f − τ s
¯¯
> 2
q
Φ
2a¯−amed , eq. (25) exhibits three roots δ = 0, δ =
τf−τs+
?
(τf−τs)
2− 4Φ
2a¯−amed
2
and δ =
τf−τs−
?
(τf−τs)
2− 4Φ
2a¯−amed
2
.
In addition, as lim
δ2→0
∂
?
2a¯−amed
2a¯−amed+
Φ
δ2
?
∂δ2 = 0, the dynamics can be represented
as in Figure (7) if τ f > τ s. Therefore, in that case there exists two sta-
ble equilibria characterized by δ = 0 and δ =
τf−τs+
?
(τf−τs)
2− 4Φ
2a¯−amed
2
, i.e.
respectively by τ ∗ = τ f and τ ∗ = 1
2
³
τ f + τ s −
q
(τ f − τ s)2 − 4Φ
2a¯−amed
´
.
Appendix E. Stationary history
From (17), (20) and (22) we have:
πit−1 = ψ {(1− τ t−1) [πit−2 + (2− τ t−1) ait−1 + εit−1] + τ t−1 [π¯t−2 + (2− τ t−1) a¯t−1]}
(26)
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Figure 7: Dynamics and stable equilibria when τ f − τ s > 2
q
Φ
2a¯−amed
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Let us assume an institutional stationary history such that τ s = τ−1, ∀s ≤
t− 1, in such a case, from (26) we have σ2πt−1 = σ2π (τ−1)
= ψ2 (1− τ−1)2
£
σ2π (τ−1) + (2− τ t−1)
2 σ2a + σ2ε
¤
and therefore:
σ2π (τ−1) =
ψ2 (1− τ−1)2
1− ψ2 (1− τ−1)2
£
(2− τ−1)2 σ2a + σ2ε
¤
It follows that ∂σ
2
π(τ−1)
∂τ−1
< 0 and then that ∂τ
f
t
∂τ−1
≤ 0.
From (26) we also have
π¯t−1 = π¯ (τ−1) = ψ1−ψ(1−τ−1) {(1− τ−1) (2− τ−1) a¯+ τ−1 [π¯ (τ−1) + (2− τ−1) a¯]}
and
πmedt−1 = πmed (τ−1) = ψ1−ψ(1−τ−1) {(1− τ−1) (2− τ−1) amed + τ−1 [π¯ (τ−1) + (2− τ−1) a¯]}.
It follows that:
π¯t−1 − πmedt−1 = π¯ (τ−1)− πmed (τ−1) =
ψ (1− τ−1) (2− τ−1)
1− ψ (1− τ−1)
(a¯− amed)
and therefore:
τ st =
2 (a¯− amed) + (π¯t−1 − πmedt−1)
2a¯− amed
=
h
2 + ψ(1−τ−1)(2−τ−1)
1−ψ(1−τ−1)
i
(a¯− amed)
2a¯− amed
It follows that ∂τ
s
t
∂τ−1
≤ 0.
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